Spectral efficiency and transmission security are both essential metrics for wireless communication. Rate compatible modulation (RCM) is an adaptive transmission scheme to improve the spectral efficiency. However, the mapping matrix of RCM is fixed. Once the mapping matrix is known to eavesdroppers, information will be leaked. Physical layer encryption (PLE) is a secure approach to enhance the security using encryption at physical layer. In this paper, we propose a secure transmission scheme for RCM, namely, secure RCM (S-RCM). The construction method of RCM mapping matrix is of great random. Combined with PLE, S-RCM mainly uses the secret key extracted from the channel information to generate mapping matrix. Due to the randomness of channel, the mapping matrix will also be random. Security analysis shows that the demapping of S-RCM must be based on the right mapping matrix. It also shows that S-RCM owns extremely large cipher mapping matrix space, which makes it impossible for eavesdropper to guess the mapping matrix. Furthermore, known-plaintext attack (KPA) is hardly impossible to get the mapping matrix due to the high calculations and multiple possibilities. Simulation result shows that the S-RCM have the same throughput performance and bit error rate (BER) performance as RCM. In addition, the simulation results also show that eavesdropper faces extremely high complexity, which is thought safe.
I. INTRODUCTION
How to increase the spectral efficiency and achieve secure transmission over rapidly time-varying channel has been research focuses for wireless communication. High spectral efficiency and secure communication are both challenging problems in the fifth generation (5G) communication scenarios.
Adaptive transmission technique, which adjusts the modulation constellation, channel coding rate and so on, is an effective way to raise spectral efficiency. Until now, many adaptive transmission techniques have been proposed. Adaptive coding and modulation (ACM) scheme [1] , [2] which selects the best combination of modulation and channel coding has been widely used. However, the selection depends on the instant and accurate channel state information (CSI), which is hard to estimate due to rapid channel variations and transmission delay in practical communication environment.
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Moreover, the transmission rate of ACM is stair-case due to the limited number of selections.
In order to address the above problems, many rateless codes such as raptor codes [3] , Luby Transform (LT) codes [4] , spinal codes [5] and analog fountain codes (AFC) [6] , have been proposed recently. In addition, rate compatible modulation (RCM) as a novel modulation technology was proposed in [7] , [8] . These schemes all achieve smooth transmission rate and avoid troublesome CSI estimation at the same time. In particular, RCM achieves great performance at a wild range of signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) compared to conventional adaptive technology and the decoding algorithm of RCM can be implemented in parallel [9] .
Transmission security has been another important challenge with the rapid development of wireless communication technology. Due to the broadcast characteristics of wireless channels, leakage and decipherment of signal has been a major threat to security issue. Encryption technology has been wildly used to ensure security. Many encryption algorithms, such as SNOW 3G [10] , ZUC [11] , AES [12] , have been applied in long-term evolution (LTE) system. However, security will face new challenge in 5G scenarios, such as enhanced mobile broadband (eMBB), massive machine type communication (mMTC) and ultra-reliable and low latency communication (uRLLC) .
Since Shannon's excellent paper [13] , confidentiality and reliability have been closely combined. However, modern cryptography theories are kept separate from the foundations of wireless communication for a lone time. Physical layer security (PLS) combined these two aspects. In [14] , physical layer security issues are considered by Wyner in error channel, which is called information theory security. Following Wyner's significant research, many novel technologies for PLS have been proposed, such as cooperative techniques [15] , artificial noise techniques [16] - [18] , multi-antenna beamforming [19] and so on.
Physical layer encryption (PLE) is another security approach, which tends to enhance the security using encryption at physical layer. Compared with upper-layer encryption at the bit-level, PLE confuses the eavesdroppers by processing the transmitted signal. Unlike the method used by physical layer security, PLE doesn't require channel state information and doesn't rely on channel condition. Therefore, PlE is a more practical and effective method. PLE has been researched in many systems, such as massive multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) [20] - [22] , rateless codes [23] , orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM) [24] , [25] , IEEE 802.15.4 protocols [26] and sparse-code multiple-access (SCMA) [27] .
In this paper, a novel physical encryption scheme which is named S-RCM is intended to achieve secure transmission for rate compatible modulation. The literature [28] - [30] have explained mathematical model, cryptography primitives and frameworks of PLE. It is known that PLE is able to use the randomness of the channel to extract the secret key, which makes PLE still secure when the eavesdropper's channel is better than the ''Alice to Bob'' channel. Furthermore, the construction method of RCM mapping matrix is random and these mapping matrices can achieve comparable performance. Depending on these characteristics, S-RCM combines the construction method of mapping matrix with PLE. More specifically, S-RCM uses the secret key extracted from channel information to decide the mapping matrix. Due to the randomness of the channel, mapping matrix will also become random. Security analysis shows that it is very hard to be cracked due to the large computational amount. Simulation results show that S-RCM is able to achieve the same performance as RCM.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the related work including RCM and PLE. The secure transmission scheme S-RCM is described in Section III. Analysis of security is discussed in Section IV. Section V shows some simulation results. Finally in section VI some conclusions are presented.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we will first review the RCM and then show the overview of physical layer encryption.
A. RATE COMPATLBLE MODUALTION
In RCM, source bits are randomly selected to generate a symbol by arithmetic summation of weighted source bits. b = (b 1 , b 2 , b 3 , . . . , b N ) ∈ (0, 1) N represents source bit vector and the length of b is N . w = {w 1 , w 2 , w 3 , . . . , w L } represents the weight set. The length of w is L, which indicates each symbol will select L bits. L is also called the degree of RCM. Let s i denote the symbol and s i is expressed as following:
where w l ∈ w and the subscript i l is the index of the bit corresponding to the weight w l . When the number of the generated symbols reaches M , the mapping process is able to be represented in matrix form:
where G denotes the M × N mapping matrix and s represents the symbol vector of length N . The construction method of RCM mapping matrix is the major factor. The mapping matrix is a sparse matrix. The non-zero elements of mapping matrix come from weight set w. Generally, {±1, ±2, ±4, ±4} is chosen as the weight set. The mapping matrix should satisfy three principles as following (more details can be found in [7] ).
1) The mapping matrix should be regular in rows.
2) The mapping matrix should be as regular as possible in columns.
3) The weight set is able to create diverse symbol values.
More specifically, the construction method is divided to three steps. The first step is to construct the elemental matrix.
(3) shows a N /8 × N /4 matrix, where x is a variable.
The weight set is considered to have three types of elements. Therefore, the value of x can be 1, 2 or 4. The elemental matrices are represented as B(1), B(2) and B(4).
The second step is to permute the column of elemental matrix randomly expressed as π (B(1)), π(B(2)) and π (B(4)), where π (·) represents the process of random permutation of columns of a matrix and π (·) is different each time.
The third step is to use the elemental matrix to construct the base matrix G 0 . In order to satisfy the above three principles of mapping matrix construction, (4) shows the composition of base matrix.
π (B(4)) π (B(4)) π (B(2)) π (B(1)) π (B(2)) π (B(1)) π (B(4)) π (B(4)) π (B(4)) π (B(4)) π (B(1)) π (B(2)) π (B(1)) π (B(2)) π (B(4)) π (B(4))
Generally, stacking different number of base matrix will constitute a mapping matrix of RCM. According to the generation process, it is able to generate a mountain of mapping matrices. In addition, most of these matrices have almost similar performance.
B. PHYSICAL LAYER ENCRYPTION
PLE is a security scheme built on computation and complexity. It is totally different from conventional cryptography. The process of encryption is actually a transformation of message space to cipher signal space. As for the conventional cryptography, the message space and cipher signal space are binary space. However, PLE faces continuous vector space. In addition, conventional cryptography is built on the premise of the error-free channel while PLE is able to use the channel errors to increase the difficulty of decryption by combining encryption and communication modules.
The communication system model of physical layer encryption is shown in Fig. 1 . Assume that the binary vector is b and the secret key is K. The PLE will convert b into cipher signal space y according K.
Cipher signal space χ : a set of cipher signal. All the cipher signal y ∈ χ.
Key space κ: a set of possible encryption key. All the encryption key K ∈ κ.
Let f denote the encryption algorithm. The process can be represented as
As for an encryption system, the security largely depends on the secret key and cipher signal space. As for PLE, the secret key is extracted from the channel. Transmission channel is generally time-varying, which greatly improves the security of PLE. Cipher signal space is another important aspect. When the eavesdropper receives the cipher signals, the process of recovering the original information needs to have large amount of computation. If the computation is too large to be completed, the encryption system will be deemed to be secure.
PLE is utilized to increase the security. Therefore, PLE should be able to prevent eavesdroppers from recovering information. Apart from the security, PLE system has some other basic principles. For example, PLE should ensure the legitimate receiver is able to recover the received signal correctly. What's more, PLE system should consider the transmission efficiency and reliability of the original system in the process of encryption.
III. SECURE TRANSMISSION SCHEME
In the section, we will propose the scheme of S-RCM. The design principles of S-RCM are to ensure performance and enhance security.
According to section II-A, it is known that the third step of construction method of mapping matrix is to generate base matrices. It should be noted that the base matrices are all randomly generated. According to (3) and (4), each elemental matrix has N /4 columns and each base matrix is composed of 16 elemental matrices. The number of base matrix that may be generated is ((N /4)!) 16 . Therefore, the construction method is very random. The randomness characteristic is the premise to combine PLE.
As is known to all, channel state is strongly time-varying in many environments. In PLE, secret keys are extracted according to channel information. Owing to the reason, PLE is able to ensure security.
Through the above analysis, the core idea of S-RCM is use the secret key extracted from the channel to determine the mapping matrix. In this case, the mapping matrix will constantly change. It is different from original PLE. Original PLE generally achieves the transformation between modulation signal and cipher signal, and the cipher signal space is usually different from modulation signal space. As for S-RCM, the process of encryption is on the construction of mapping matrix and the cipher signal space is the same as modulation signal space. Furthermore, S-RCM creates a cipher mapping matrix space. Compared with RCM, the specific changes of S-RCM are as follows:
1) The transmitter and the receiver no longer store a complete fixed mapping matrix. 2) As for elemental matrices, some ways of column permutation will be generated and these ways will be stored. Therefore, the ways of column permutation of elemental matrices are not fixed. 3) These elemental matrices in the mapping matrix will be numbered. The secret key K extracted from channel will determine the way of column permutation of each elemental matrix. On the basis of these changes, the transmission model of S-RCM is shown as Fig.2 . It is known according to the model of S-RCM that S-RCM is actually the physical layer encryption of RCM. The encryption process of S-RCM appears on the design of the mapping matrix, which is completely different from the frame of conventional PLE. Compared with RCM, the cipher signal space of S-RCM hasn't changed. How to use the secret key to generate the mapping matrix is one crucial step of S-RCM. The details will be described below.
According to the previous analysis, there are many ways of column permutation of elemental matrix. One critical factor of S-RCM is that transmitter and receiver will store the ways of column permutation of elemental matrix. However, storing all the ways of column permutation takes up huge storage space. Therefore, part ways of column permutation are selected as candidates. Assume that the number of candidate ways is β. β satisfies the following condition:
where α is the positive integer. The key K is usually a binary sequence of length n represented as following:
Every α elements of K will be a block and correspond to an elemental matrix of mapping matrix. The way of column permutation of the elemental matrix will be determined by the α bits. For example, assume that 256 ways are stored and each way is numbered, β = 256. According to (6) , every 8 bits of K will be a block, α = 8. In addition, each 8 bits will correspond to one elemental matrix and determine the way of column permutation. When n = 256, it is able to decide 32 elemental matrices, which can constitute two base matrices.
IV. ANALYSIS OF SECURITY
In this section, security will be discussed in three aspects including the demapping of S-RCM, cipher mapping matrix space and known plaintext attack (KPA).
A. DEMAPPING OF RCM
Let s denote the vector of the received symbols. Through an additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel, s can be represented as following:
where e is the channel noise and each element of e satisfies Gaussian distribution. The task of receiver is to find out the source bits with maximum a posterior (MAP) probability. It can be simplified to find out the optimal solution of the following problem:
where b is the source bits and b is the estimate of MAP. The belief propagation algorithm proposed in [7] , [31] has been proved to be able so solve the problem. Next, many simplified algorithms are proposed [8] , [9] , [32] . Let each received symbol represent the symbol node and let each source bit represent variable node. The mapping between symbols and bits is shown as Fig.3 (shown at the top of next page). These demapping algorithms are all based on belief propagation (BP) between nodes. The BP algorithm are divided into four processes.
1) INITIALIZATION
Let t represent the number of iteration. The symbol node set is s and variable node set is b. b i is the element of b and s j is the element of s. When t = 1, the initial message from b i to s j is represented as U
where p 0 is a constant. computed as following:
where p e is the probability density function of noise, k represents each possible value of s j\i and w ij is the weight corresponding to the symbol node s j and variable node b i .
3) PROCESSING AT VARIABLE NODE
Let M(i) denote the symbol nodes set connected to variable node b i . M(i\j) represents the set of M(i) excluding symbol node s j .The probability p i (0), p i (1) of variable node x i can be computed as following:
The message passed from variable node x i to the neighboring symbol node s j is represented as U
4) DECISION PROCESS
The decision process after t iterations is base on the values of p i (0) and p i (1) . The decision criteria is as following:
Through above analysis, it can be found that the process of RCM demapping is complicated and is totally associated with the mapping matrix. Whether it is a symbol node process or a variable node process, message passing relies on the correct connection of symbol nodes and variable nodes. Any wrong connection will have a negative influence on the demapping process of corresponding symbol nodes and variable nodes. In addition, the non-zero positions of mapping matrix represents the connection between specific symbol node and variable node. The value of non-zero position represents the weight between specific symbol node and variable node. Therefore, the necessary condition for obtaining accurate information is to use the correct mapping matrix.
B. CIPHER MAPPING MATRIX SPACE
Through the previous analysis, it is known that the mapping matrix is the crucial factor. The encryption process of S-RCM is to use the secret key extracted from the channel to generate the cipher mapping matrix. Therefore, it is necessary to discuss the size of cipher mapping matrix space, which determines the security.
The size of cipher mapping matrix space can be measured in terms of quantity of matrices. The number of mapping matrix of S-RCM depends on the number of column permutation ways in storage and the number of elemental matrix. Assume that the number of column permutation ways is β and the number of elemental matrix is θ . It is able to construct β θ mapping matrices. The following uses a specific example to illustrate.
Assume that the encryption system stores 128 column permutation ways, β = 128. The number of elemental matrix is 32, θ = 32. If the size of elemental matrix is 100 × 200 and two base matrices is used to form mapping matrix, the size of G will be 400 × 400. The number of mapping matrices that can be generated will reach 128 32 , simplified to 2 224 . It means that eavesdropper will face 2 224 choices even if the attacker knows the ways of column permutation in storage. In addition, eavesdropper can't judge whether it is correct.
According to the above analysis, the probability of selecting the correct mapping matrix for eavesdropper is very low. Every guess for mapping matrix need to pay the cost of demapping complexity. The complexity of demapping mainly depends on the symbol node process and is related to the weight set. Table 1 shows the amount of computation for one iteration in one symbol node process. When the number of iteration is 10 and the symbol nodes are 400, the number of multiplication and addition will reach 4.368×10 6 and 3.28×10 6 respectively for demapping. When β = 128 and θ = 32, there are 2 224 matrices in cipher mapping matrix space. Therefore, the eavesdropper need to make up to 2 224 attempts. The amount of multiplication and addition will reach 4.368 × 10 6 × 2 224 and 3.28 × 10 6 × 2 224 respectively, which are considered a safe computation.
According to above analysis, S-RCM brings a huge cipher mapping matrix space, which greatly increases the computational complexity for eavesdropper.
C. KNOWN-PLAINTEXT ATTACK
Known-plaintext attack (KPA) is a commonly used security analysis method. In KPA, we generally assume that the eavesdropper Eve knows the transmitted message. The goal of KPA is to determine the mapping matrix according to the known message. If the mapping matrix is found, Eve can use the knowledge of mapping matrix acquiring unknown source bits through wiretap channel. Let b e denote the message known by Eve and s e denote the transmitted symbols. s e = Gb e + e (15) where e is the noise. s e and b e are known to Eve. The task of Eve is to find G. According to the construction method of G, the number of the non-zero elements of each row equals to the number of elements of weight set. Therefore, G is a sparse matrix. Finding G is actually to determine the non-zero elements of G. Assume g νι represent the element of G, where ν represents the row and ι represents the column. It should be noted that each row corresponds to a symbol. s e ν is the symbol corresponding to the ν-th row of G, s e ν ∈ s e . The task of Eve can be simplified to solve the following equations.
In (16) , each equation is independent. These elements of each row is only based on one equation. It can be found that this is an equation with ν + 1 unknown parameters including the noise. In theory, it requires ν+1 equations to get these elements. However, each parameter only corresponds to one equation. In this case, there will be multiple results. The number of elements in the weight set is l. There will be A l ι possibilities. For example, when l = 8 and the size of G is 400 × 400, the number will reach A 8 400 , which is greater than 2 69 . Therefore, it is hard to require the right results. According to above analysis, KPA is invalid to get the mapping matrix.
Through above analysis, it can be found that the demapping of RCM must based on right mapping matrix. In addition, S-RCM owns huge cipher mapping matrix space and is effective to resist KPA.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In order to evaluate the performance of S-RCM, we simulated the throughput and bit error rate (BER) performances. The simulation is mainly based on MATLAB. In addition, we compare the security of the two schemes by computational complexity.
A. IMPLEMENTATION
As for legal receiver, we implement the simulation of RCM and S-RCM. As for eavesdropper, we assume that Eve can require the transmitted symbols and Eve uses the guessed matrix to finish demapping. In the demapping process, the number of iteration is set to be 10.
RCM: The length of each block source bits is 400. The mapping matrix is fixed and the size of mapping matrix is 400 × 400. We use w = {±1, ±2, ±4, ±4} as the weight set.
S-RCM: The size of mapping matrix and weight set are both the same as RCM. The difference is that S-RCM uses different mapping matrix for each block source bits. We randomly generate a binary sequence each time as the secret key extracted from channel. The mapping matrix is constructed according to the sequence. In this case, the mapping matrix is different for each block source bits.
B. THROUGHPUT PERFORMANCE
In order to evaluate the spectrum efficiency of S-RCM, we compare the achievable rate of S-RCM with RCM. The simulation is under the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel and fading channel. We simulate 10 7 bits, which is 25000 blocks. Fig. 4 shows the throughput performance of RCM and S-RCM under AWGN channel. Fig. 5 shows the throughput performance of RCM and S-RCM under fading channel. We used IEEE 802.11a fading channel model. The detail can be found in [33] . We can see that S-RCM and RCM has almost consistent throughput curve. As for eavesdropper, the throughput is always 0. Therefore, effective information has not been available for eavesdropper. According to the simulation result, the conclusion that S-RCM has the same throughput as RCM can be drawn.
C. BER PERFORMANCE
In order to evaluate the reliable performance of S-RCM, we compare the BER of S-RCM with RCM under AWGN channel. Four different transmission rates are selected. Let represent the transmission number of symbols. We compare the four cases of = 200, 500, 600 and 800, respectively. Fig. 6 shows the BER performance of S-RCM and RCM. It can be found that the BER performance will be better when the number of transmitted symbol is increased. In addition, the curves of S-RCM and RCM almost overlap. Therefore, it also can be concluded that S-RCM has almost the same BER performance as RCM. As for eavesdropper, the BER has always been 0.5. This also shows that eavesdroppers can't get effective information.
D. COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS
As for the security performance, computational complexity is selected as the evaluation metric. Assume that the eavesdropper acquires the mechanism of the transmitter. It means that the fixed mapping matrix of RCM is exposed to eavesdropper and that the mapping matrix generation way of S-RCM is exposed to eavesdropper. In this case, we analyze the security of the two schemes according to the computational complexity of the eavesdropper's access to information.
As for RCM scheme, eavesdropper will use the fixed mapping matrix to finish demapping. As for S-RCM scheme, eavesdropper will guess the mapping matrix based on the stored column permutation ways. Assume that 128 ways of column permutation are stored and 32 elemental matrices constitute mapping matrix. Table 2 shows the comparison of computation complexity of RCM and S-RCM. It can be concluded that computational complexity of S-RCM for eavesdropper to obtain information is much higher than that of RCM. In addition, computational complexity of S-RCM is theoretically safe.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper proposed a secure transmission scheme for rate compatible modulation, namely S-RCM. The construction method of RCM mapping matrix has the random characteristics. S-RCM mainly combines PLE and construction of mapping matrix. PLE is very different from traditional cryptography and the process of PLE is essentially a conversion from a simple domain to more complicated domain. In S-RCM, many column permutation ways of elemental matrices are stored. The secret key extracted from channel is used to determine which permutation way is used for the specific elemental matrix. In this case, the whole mapping matrix will be determined by the channel information and will change as the channel state. Security analysis comprises the following three aspects. First of all, using the received symbols to get the information must base on the right mapping matrix. Then, S-RCM brings huge cipher mapping matrix space, which make it impossible for Eve to crack the mapping matrix due to the unimaginable amount of computation. Finally, KPA is also invalid for S-RCM due to multiple solutions. Performance evaluation shows that S-RCM has the exact throughput performance and BER performance as RCM. As for the eavesdropper, the throughput remains 0 and the BER continues to be 0.5. Therefore, S-RCM enhances security while maintaining transmission performance. In the future, we will further study the physical layer encryption scheme for adaptive transmission. 
